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Introduction
The question whether corporate insiders exploit inside information while trading in their company's stock attracts the attention of academia and the public alike.
1 Moreover, the answer to this question is also crucial for regulatory authorities, since on a capital market there is a loser for each winner. In particular, if corporate insiders exploit inside information, high profits received by corporate insiders reduce the returns of all other uniformed traders (including the market maker). Thus, a well developed capital market requires an effective insider regulation to protect uninformed investors. Our study basically addresses three questions. First, we analyze whether corporate insiders earn abnormal profits while trading in their company's stock. Second, we use a distinct property of German law, i.e. the companies' obligation of companies to reveal inside information through ad-hoc news disclosures, to examine whether profits realized by corporate insiders seem to be due to the exploitation of inside information or not.
Finally, we explore which group of insiders is most active in exploiting inside information: the one which is best informed about a company's prospects (i.e., senior managers) or the one which is probably least closely watched by the regulator (i.e., family members of senior managers and directors).
Today, insider regulations prohibit the exploitation of inside information on capital markets in nearly all developed countries. In Germany, §14 WpHG (Security Trading Act) prohibits the exploitation and transmission of inside information. According to German law, inside information can be described as any specific information which is not subject to public knowledge and which, if it became publicly known, would likely have a significant effect on the stock price of the respective company ( §13 WpHG).
Moreover, §15 WpHG requires an immediate public disclosure (ad-hoc announcement)
of any inside information (as defined in §13 WpHG) by the respective company. As corporate insiders (i.e., senior managers, directors and their family members) are 1 In 2005, according to its annual report, the German regulatory authority Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) investigated 54 cases related to suspected insider trading. E.g., several managers at DaimlerChrysler were suspected to exploit inside information prior to the resignation of the former CEO Jürgen Schrempp (Handelsblatt, August 29, 2005). However, the probably most prominent suspicion was about the former Co-CEO of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), Noël Forgeard, who sold together with his children stocks and stock options for a seven digit profit just a few weeks before EADS disclosed severe difficulties in the production of the airplane A380 (Handelsblatt, June 21, 2006). particularly suspected to possess and exploit inside information, due to their superior knowledge about company's prospects, §15a WpHG additionally requires companies to report and publish corporate insiders' transactions in their company's stock.
Particularly, since July 1, 2002, corporate insider transactions have to be reported to the regulatory authority, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) 2 , which monitors whether transactions were based on the exploitation of inside information.
Trading activities of corporate insiders have been subject to a large number of studies.
One strand of literature focuses on the announcement day of insider transactions and explores if uninformed outsiders can benefit by mimicking insider transactions (e.g., The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the legal background of insider trading in Germany whereas section 3 addresses the database, provides some descriptive statistics and discusses the methodology. Section 4 presents the results concerning our three research questions. Finally, section 5 concludes. are also obliged to report their transactions. The reporting period for trading activities was specified to occur within five business days. The lower limit, which does not require a disclosure, was also reduced to 5,000 € per person in a calendar year.
Legal Background
Furthermore, companies are now required to maintain lists of persons which have access to inside information ( §15b WpHG). International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) of the reporting company, the name and type of the reporting insider (e.g., a member of the executive board), the trading and announcement day, the kind of transaction (e.g., a purchase of a stock), the number of securities traded, the stock price at which the transaction was executed, and the publishing media.
Data and Methodology
To check and complement the database we match the information contained in the original database with statements from the company's annual reports and information published on the company's web site and other financial web sites. 5 The Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc Publizität (DGAP) and euro-adhoc are the main providers which transmit ad-hoc news to the market. We use their databases to identify ad-hoc news releases subsequent to the trading day. Data on stock returns we extract from
Datastream.
As our study focuses on the German legislation and the German market we only cover trades in stocks with a German ISIN (DE-ISIN). The original database contains 6,328
transactions carried out by insiders in 416 different firms. In a first step, we exclude duplicate and incomplete entries as well as transactions connected with derivates, stock options, security lending, changes in the capital structure, and take-over bids. In addition, transactions among insiders, which are rather driven by strategic, liquidity or tax reasons, are also excluded. In 1,577 cases the database includes two or more transactions of the same insider in the same stock on a given day. This is the case if an insider trades more than once on the same day or if the broker executes the order in two or more pieces. We aggregate these partial executions and multiple trades of the same individual in the same security on a given day. Furthermore, we exclude 136 observations due to incomplete return data. Finally, in 125 cases firms disclose ad-hoc news on the transaction day itself. As mentioned before, we use ad-hoc news disclosures to link insider trading to a potential exploitation of inside information. As we do not have information about the exact trading time, we could not determine whether the corporate insider traded prior to the respective ad-hoc news disclosure.
Thus, these transactions were excluded from the sample. Table I shows the generation of our final sample which consists of 3,079 insider transactions in 351 different firms.
Thereof, 767 transactions in the final sample are succeeded by a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure in the following 20 trading days. In total, insiders traded stocks for more than 1.86 € billion. Interestingly, although they trade least frequently, the group of other insiders trade the highest volumes accounting for almost 40% of the total trading volume. In particular, their median (mean) As in most empirical studies the distribution of firm size is skewed. The mean market capitalization of a traded firm is 1,868 € million and thereby highly exceeds the median market capitalization which equals 44 € million. Moreover, the group of other insiders does not only trade higher volumes. They also trade in bigger companies. In particular, the median (mean) market capitalization in which the group of other insiders trades equals 172 € million (3,522 € million).
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of our study is to measure the short-term profits of insiders which trade in their company's stock. In accordance with most studies on insider trading, we measure these profits in an event study framework. Concretely, we measure abnormal returns,
i.e., returns that deviate from the normal return, subsequent to the insider trading day by applying standard event-study methodology outlined by MacKinlay (1997 
Empirical Results

INSIDER PROFITS
First, we address the question whether corporate insiders do earn abnormal returns by trading in their company's stock. Interestingly, from the perspective of the efficient market hypothesis, the price reaction is strikingly slow. In particular, after a period of five trading days subsequent to the insider transaction, only about 36% of the total increase within the 20-day event window is incorporated in stock prices (1.36% compared to 3.76%). The respective fraction for the ten-day period is about 58% (CAR[0;+10] equals 2.19%), an almost linear adjustment to the cumulative abnormal return at the end of the event window. The rather slow adjustment in stock prices might be explained by legal aspects. As discussed before, corporate insiders have to announce their trading records to the regulatory authority BaFin shortly after they have executed their order. Our data reveals that the median (mean) time period between the trading and the announcement day is three (ten)
trading days for purchases. Thus, since insider transactions are closely followed by many investors, it may trigger a wave of transactions in the same direction by outsiders, thereby generating abnormal returns subsequent to the trading day. In addition, news releases by the company or reports issued by financial analysts, for instance, might impact stock prices subsequent to the insider's trading day as well. The finding that insiders realize greater profits with their purchases than with their sales is also documented in the literature. 8 Unlike purchases, which are primarily motivated by the desire to realize profits, sales might be triggered by other considerations. First, 7 Please note that the finding of a slow price adjustment is documented in several other studies. See, (e.g. Interestingly, although this issue is somewhat beyond the scope of our paper, insiders are amazingly good at identifying turning points as they buy (sell) at the end of downward (upward) movements and at the beginning of upward (downward) movements of company's stock price. In particular, we find corporate insiders to follow contrarian strategies. Table III 
DO INSIDERS EXPLOIT INSIDE INFORMATION?
A decisive prerequisite to answer the question whether corporate insiders exploit inside information is the identification of those transactions which may exploit inside information. In an ideal world one could directly observe the information set of an insider at the transaction day. Unfortunately, in reality this information is basically unobservable. Thus, one has to find an observable proxy for inside information.
Probably the best way to identify trades which are likely to be based on inside information formally, is to link corporate insider trading to ad-hoc news disclosures subsequent to the insider trading day. As mentioned before, German firms are required to disclose any inside information to the public via an ad-hoc announcement. Those adhoc announcements deal with corporate events which are likely to have a significant effect on the stock price like, e.g., changes in the executive board structure, earnings announcements, and merger activities. Thus, insider trading prior to ad-hoc news disclosures is a first indication for the exploitation of inside information, since corporate insiders are likely to know at least the tendency of the ad-hoc news prior to their disclosure. For instance, it is hard to believe that a senior manager is not continuously informed about the performance of her firm or is not involved in and informed about takeover proceedings.
However, companies disclose specific ad-hoc news like quarterly earnings on a rather regular basis. Thus, some ad-hoc announcements might not contain unexpected news.
Consequently, not every transaction prior to an ad-hoc news disclosure necessarily exploits inside information. Two scenarios have to be distinguished in order to detect the exploitation of inside information. On the one hand, if insiders exploit inside information by front-running on ad-hoc news disclosures, they should, ceteris paribus, earn higher profits with those transactions compared to the remaining transactions without a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure. On the other hand, if insiders do not exploit inside information while trading prior to news disclosures, the profits of transactions with subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure should be similar to profits of transactions without subsequent news disclosure. As a consequence, we feel confident to accuse insiders of exploitation of inside information if transactions of insiders, which are succeeded by an ad-hoc news disclosure of the respective company in the subsequent 20 trading days, are associated with higher profits compared to the remaining transactions without an ad-hoc news disclosure. In the following, we will refer to those transactions as unethical or illegal. With respect to purchases, we find that 403 of the total 1,643 purchases are succeeded by an ad-hoc news disclosure, representing a fraction of almost 25%. Remarkably, those 403 transactions yield substantially higher profits for insiders compared to the remaining transactions. In particular, corporate insiders earn an abnormal profit of 5.05% within the 20 trading days after they front-run on ad-hoc news disclosures. For transactions without a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure, we document a respective value of mere 3.34%. Moreover, the difference in mean profits between trades which front-run on corporate news disclosure and the remaining transactions without a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure is statistically significant on the 10%-level starting with CAR[0;+5] onward. Thus, we find strong evidence for the exploitation of inside information according to our definition. Corporate insiders as a group purchase companies' stocks in an unethical way.
Concerning sales, results are quite similar. The fraction of sales which is succeeded by an ad-hoc news disclosure is about 25%. Again, the profits associated with those transactions are considerably higher for all analyzed periods. However, the differences in means between transactions with and without subsequent news disclosure are statistically insignificant. In consequence, the evidence that corporate insiders exploit inside information while selling company's stock is less solid than for purchases.
Despite the lack of statistical significance, e.g., the CAR[0;+20] is almost double the magnitude for sales which front-run on subsequent news releases compared to the remaining transactions.
WHICH TYPE OF INSIDER EXPLOITS INSIDE INFORMATION?
In this section we want to investigate which type of corporate insider is particularly engaged in exploiting inside information. To put things differently, we want to figure out if it is primarily the group of members of the executive board, the group of members of the supervisory board or the group of other corporate insiders which tend to trade in an unethical manner. Table V displays for each group of insiders the group-specific fraction of trades with a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure separately. In addition, the respective fraction for the total sample as well as the difference between the fractions for the group and for the total sample are displayed in the table. Panel A shows the respective statistics for purchases, whereas Panel B refers to sales.
As far as purchases are concerned, senior managers are less often engaged in transactions which are succeeded by corporate news. The fraction of purchases with a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure is only 19.86% compared to the average of the total sample which shows to be 24.56%. In addition, the binomial test indicates on a statistically significant level that senior managers find themselves more frequently in the group of transactions without ad-hoc news disclosures. A different picture emerges for directors. With respect to trading prior to ad-hoc news disclosures, 32.12% of the purchases carried out by directors front-run on corporate news. Moreover, the binomial test strongly suggests that directors trade more frequently prior to ad-hoc news disclosures. Finally, the group of other insiders is not predominantly engaged in trading prior to ad-hoc news. In contrast to the findings for purchases, we do not find any group of insiders to be particularly engaged in trading prior to ad-hoc news disclosure on the sell side. This table reports the distribution of purchases and sales for the total sample and for different types of insider separately.
(1) displays for the respective group of insiders the fraction of the number of purchases with a subsequent news disclosure to the total number of purchases by the respective group. Accordingly, (2) gives the respective numbers for the total sample. E.g. the fraction of 24.56% for purchases is calculated as the number of purchases with a subsequent news disclosure (403) divided by the total number of purchases (1643). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level according to the binomial test. For purchases, we find that senior managers do not seem to be engaged in unethical insider trading. Not only do they trade less frequently prior to ad-hoc news releases;
senior managers also realize profits below average. Particularly, the CAR[0;+20] equals 2.39% for purchases with subsequent news disclosures in the 20 trading days after the trading day, whereas senior managers obtain 4.45% with transactions which were not succeeded by ad-hoc news disclosures. However, from a statistical point of view, the difference in means of -2.06% is not statistically different from zero. A very different picture emerges when we look at directors' purchases. In addition to their significantly higher trading frequency prior to ad-hoc news releases, they obviously trade on valuable information. E.g., the CAR[0;+20] for front-running purchases equals 6.57%, whereas the transactions without ad-hoc news disclosures result in a mere profit of 1.89%.
Moreover, the difference in means between both types of purchases is highly statistically significant, indicating that directors trade on inside information. We get a similar result concerning the group of other insiders. Even though other insiders do not frequently front-run on corporate news, they do realize exceptional profits with those transactions. In particular, they realize CAR[0;+20] of 8.05% with front-running purchases. A handsome profit compared to the respective 2.36% they earn with their remaining transactions. The difference in means between both transaction types is also highly statistically significant.
Regarding sales transactions, we find no specific group of insiders to be severely engaged in exploiting inside information. Although we predominately find the profits associated with sales which front-run on corporate news to be higher for all groups of insiders, differences in means of abnormal returns are not statistically significant.
Again, this result could be driven by the fact that selling company's stock does not have to be information-driven, but can be triggered by diversification, liquidity and tax considerations.
To sum up, we can conclude that senior managers do not seem to exploit inside information. They seem to be aware that the public and the regulator monitor their trading records very carefully. Thus, they refrain from trading prior to ad-hoc news disclosures. And even if they do so, the information content of the subsequent ad-hoc news release seems to be quite negligible. In contrast, directors do not seem to fear the scrutiny of the regulator as they do not only purchase company's stock quite frequently prior to ad-hoc news releases but they also seem to front-run on extremely valuable inside information. A similar result applies to the group of other insiders. They also seem to exploit inside information. In contrast, the evidence for sales transactions is less clear-cut. Profits for sales which front-run on corporate news disclosure are predominately smaller than those for purchases and statistically insignificant for all types of insiders
Concluding Remarks
Our study analyzes a large sample of corporate insider transactions reported to the German supervisory authority BaFin in the period July 1, 2002 to April 30, 2005 using event study methodology. In particular, we focus on the question whether corporate insiders exploit inside information while trading in company's stock. Our findings reveal that corporate insiders are able to identify profitable investment situations in their firms. E.g., they earn a profit of almost four percent in the 20 trading days after they purchased company's stock. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that corporate insiders are engaged in the exploitation of inside information as they earn above average profits by front-running on corporate news. Finally, looking at the type of insider, we find that members of the supervisory board (directors) and the group of other insiders (basically family members of senior managers and directors) are the ones which trade in an unethical manner as they profit largely by exploiting inside information while frontrunning on corporate news. In contrast, members of the executive board (senior managers) can be exculpated from exploiting inside information as they realize below average returns with their rare front-running transactions.
Admittedly, our database might not be the ideal sample to study illegal insider trading. This is because intentional and offensive trading on inside information is not very likely to be reported to the supervisory authority. Therefore, it is alarming that we find evidence that insiders exploit inside information in those transactions which they consider to be unproblematic and thus report. Surprisingly, until now, the regulatory authority has done very little to enforce the law and thus to assure that insiders do not trade on inside information. Our results, however, strongly suggest to watch trading records of corporate insiders more closely; especially those trades which are shortly succeeded by an ad-hoc news announcement. Particularly, those insiders (e.g. the group of other insiders) who are not in the spotlight of the public or the financial press do not seem to fear the scrutiny of the regulator as they extensively trade on inside information. Therefore, the BaFin should intensify its monitoring activities as well as its ability to impose sanctions to ensure market transparency and integrity of the German capital market. Otherwise, a continuation of illegal insider trading could compromise the functionality of the German capital market. Nevertheless, we also see the ball in the court of the firms themselves. 
